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Blowing the Whistle on
Postmodern Federalism
BRADLEY C. BOBERTZ*
I. Introduction
There is no question that post-modern federalism, a belief-
system I will discuss further, threatens the existence and effec-
tiveness of environmental law. Leslie Carothers, President of the
Environmental Law Institute (ELI), a nonpartisan research, pub-
lications, and membership group founded on the day Congress
passed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,1 was
speaking for a large and growing coalition of people and organiza-
tions when she said,
Today, ELI and other[s] ...are concerned about some dis-
turbing trends in judicial decisions that will weaken the frame-
work of federal [environmental and public health] laws ...
Supported by foundations and think tanks opposed to practi-
cally all federal regulation, many advocates in these cases are
resurrecting antiquated and discredited legal theories to limit
the power of the national government to protect the environ-
ment. We believe these arguments and the judicial decisions
adopting them are bad law and bad policy. 2
Antiquated and discredited legal theories. Bad law and bad
policy. Created and nurtured for more than a quarter century by
right-wing charities whose economic influence is seen in almost
every law school in America, in the form of donations to conserva-
* I would like to thank the two generations of Pace Environmental Law Review
editors, and everyone who helped them, for making this symposium a reality.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000). President Nixon signed NEPA into law on na-
tional TV during the halftime break of the 1970 Rose Bowl, on January 1.
2. Open Letter from Leslie Carothers, President, Environmental Law Institute 1
(Sept. 18, 2003), available at www.endangeredlaws.org/PressRoom.htm. The letter
continues, "In response, ELI is launching its new Endangered Environmental Laws
Program to shine a light on these issues. Our program will educate and support peo-
ple in the legal, policy, business and advocacy community in their work to safeguard
the environment, including the legal framework that has served our nation well." Id.
The activities of ELI's Endangered Laws program, as well as its partners and advi-
sors, can be found at www.endangeredlaws.org (last visited Dec. 5, 2003).
1
84 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
tive student groups who use the cash for indoctrination and to pay
for law school speaking tours by luminaries of the far-right. The
group Media Transparency reports that "over just one three-year
period highly conservative foundations gave some sixteen million
dollars to support programs at the nation's top law schools aimed
at encouraging deregulation."3 Three years, $16 million, or more
than $5 million a year, in support of law school programs alone.
The clout of this money is also seen in lawsuit after lawsuit
challenging the legitimacy of an entire corpus of law developed
from the early progressive era onward to curb corporate and indi-
vidual malfeasance in economic affairs, to ensure dignity for the
poor and the ill, to address and redress the ongoing effects of slav-
ery, and to give coming generations greater freedom of choice by
protecting the land, air, water, and natural resources that sur-
round and outlive us. These lawsuits deploy legal theories ges-
tated and spread willfully to dismantle the modern regulatory
state.
This money also funds free educational getaways for sitting
judges. Technically, parties in lawsuits are not allowed to influ-
ence judges outside the courtroom by means of what the law calls
"ex parte," or one-sided out-of-the-courtroom, communications.
But what if large numbers of parties who are involved in long-
term strategic litigation create a non-profit front group to provide
training and education seminars for judges and law professors?
Would that be acceptable?
Thanks to Doug Kendall we have the inside story of how these
getaways, provided free of charge by a group calling itself, of all
things, FREE, go about educating sitting judges and active law
professors. Mr. Kendall not only infiltrated the seminars, but also
traced their funding back to their corporate sponsors. 4 The semi-
nars include a mixture of attendees, including non-judges and
even political liberals, although the imprimatur of "free market
environmentalism," another intellectual catchphrase for advanc-
ing the purposes of anti-regulatory extremists, lies at the heart of
3. Press Release, Environmental Law Institute, Environmental Law Institute
Program Highlights Effort to Weaken Environmental Protection (Sept. 22, 2003),
available at http://www.endangeredlaws.org.PressRoom.htm (last visited Dec. 5,
2003) [hereinafter "Press Release"].
4. DOUGLAS KENDALL, COMMUNITY RIGHTS COUNSEL, NOTHING FOR FREE: How
PRIVATE JUDICIAL SEMINARS ARE UNDERMINING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS AND
BREAKING THE PUBLIC'S TRUST (2000), available at http://www.tripsfojudges.orgtcrc.
pdf.
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these seminars.5 When the overall message of the seminars is
one-sided and aimed at protecting the long-term litigation inter-
ests of one large subset of parties, the message can affect the legal
system over time in a way that hides its own influence. Whenever
money and power need to hide their influence, a reasonable citizen
is tempted to ask why.
We also must consider the ongoing, well-financed effort to
pack the bench. Packing the bench is nothing new. After all, FDR
threatened to do just that in the winter of 1937. However, FDR
operated in the open, and his Court-packing plan was publicly de-
bated and rejected, even if it did arguably persuade Justice Owen
Roberts to end his alliance with a bloc of retrograde robber baron
lawyers who had repeatedly struck down progressive and New
Deal legislative reforms.
But court-packing agenda carried out in secret, it seems to
me, is different from what FDR did. As the Nixon records con-
tinue to emerge, you can see court-packing schemes at their most
baroque.6 The bottom line is that Nixon appointed four Supreme
Court Justices. In order, they were Chief Burger, Blackmun, and
then, simultaneously in a live press conference on the evening of
October 21, 1971, Powell and Rehnquist.
Justices Powell and Rehnquist may be the odd couple of Su-
preme Court history. Powell was expected. Star of the Richmond
5. Id. at 9.
6. John Dean's book, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001), tells a fascinating story of
the four Nixon appointees (in order, Burger, Blackmun, and, simultaneously, Powell
and Rehnquist), the circumstances of their appointments, and the lengths the White
House was willing to go to produce an ideologically uniform Court.
For one thing, we have the story of how a vacancy was created when Justice Abe
Fortas resigned in 1969, in the midst of a scandal that, in retrospect, has all the ear-
marks of a dirty tricks campaign. Id. at 10-11. Fortas occupied the so-called "Jewish
seat," occupied by Cardozo (briefly), Frankfurter, Goldberg (very briefly), and then
Fortas. Id. at 14-15. Brandeis, the first Jewish Justice, served simultaneously with
Cardozo for a few years before he retired. His seat went to Justices Douglas and then
Justice Stevens. 1 LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. at 1383-
84 (3d ed. 2000).
To fill the "Jewish seat," the White House considered, among others, Caspar
Weinberger. Although Weinberger was in fact Episcopalian, Nixon's aides mistak-
enly believed that Weinberger was Jewish, possibly because of his surname. See id.
at 51. There were thoughts of unseating Thurgood Marshall and creating a "Black
seat" on the Court which they could fill with a black arch-conservative. Id. at 53-54.
They also thought a permanent "woman's seat" would be another stealthy way of en-
suring loyalty on the Court. Id. at 50. Nixon, pre-occupied as he was with paranoia
about enemies in general and Jews in particular, seemed in fact to have thought
Rehnquist, or "Renchbuerg," was Jewish or at least Jewish-looking. Id.
3
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bar, he helped integrate the city and was a past president of the
ABA. Powell had already turned Nixon down for the Fortas seat
that went to Blackmun, but ultimately accepted the President's
appointment to one of the two seats that opened when both Jus-
tices Hugo Black and John Harlan resigned within a week as they
lay dying in Washington area hospitals. Nixon sent them both
farewell letters on September 17, 1971 even though Justice
Harlan had yet to actually resign.7
But who was Rehnquist? Contemporary photographs show
his mutton-chop sideburns and thick glasses with squarish black
frames and a questionable assembly of clothes from that era.8 He
looked too young, at forty-one, to be a serious appointment, but it
turned out he was a brilliant man who, after finishing first in his
law school class at Stanford, clerked for Justice Jackson, and most
recently was the person "who did most of the heavy lifting" at the
Department of Justice in helping Nixon select judicial candidates.
His conservative convictions were known to the administration,
and history shows that the Rehnquist appointment was by far the
most important of Nixon's four. As John Dean summarizes,
7. To Hugo Black, Nixon wrote:
9/17/71
Dear Mr. Justice Black
This personal note expresses my deep appreciation as a fellow lawyer for
your years of service in the Court.
As I said in my statement when I received your letter of resignation-you
were the best questioner of all when I appeared before the Court....
Mrs. Nixon joins me in sending many good wishes to you in this difficult
time-
Richard Nixon
To John Harlan, Nixon wrote:
9/17/71
Dear John
I was very distressed to learn from Warren Burger of your stay in the
hospital.
This note brings my very best personal wishes during what I know must
be a difficult time for you.
The Nation and The Court will always be in your debt for your superb
public service.
RN
DEAN, supra note 6, at 43.
8. Upon first seeing Rehnquist, Nixon famously commented "who the hell is that
clown," referring to his pink shirt and other questionable clothing choices. Even more
notable is Barry Goldwater's phone call to Nixon formally recommending Rehnquist
as a Supreme Court candidate. Neither Goldwater nor Nixon could remember Rehn-
quist's name. "Rensler" was about as close as they came. Id. at 132.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol21/iss1/5
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Nixon's last-ditch decision to select William Rehnquist proved to
be among the most significant of his presidency. Its impact is
still being felt. His other choices ... were all men whose philos-
ophies and rulings proved consistent with mainstream constitu-
tional jurisprudence. The Rehnquist choice, however, has
redefined the Supreme Court, making it a politically conserva-
tive bastion within our governmental system. Rehnquist's
many years of service, and his ability as a legal scholar, have
brought about the rewriting of fundamental aspects of the na-
tion's constitutional law. With Rehnquist, Nixon found the con-
servative who would sit on the high bench for three decades,
where he could work at undoing the legacy of the Warren Court.
Nixon realized, perceptively, that in appointing a younger man
as an associate justice he might also be appointing a future chief
justice. In Nixon's words, he was appointing "a guy who's there
30 years. And who, also, if Republican is around, is a potential
candidate for chief justice."9
Subsidies for conservative student groups and scholarship,
subsidies for anti-regulatory litigation, the wining and dining of
sitting judges, efforts to pack to the bench: they all have had their
effect on American law. "These and allied activities are having a
pernicious impact on the federal judiciary, both on nominees to fill
judicial vacancies and on decisions that federal judges render," ac-
cording to Pace University School of Law professor Jeffrey G.
Miller.' 0 "The public should know that judicial decisions under-
mining environmental protections aren't the result of blind jus-
tice, but a carefully orchestrated campaign by conservative
extremists.""
9. DEAN, supra note 6, at 265.
10. Press Release, supra note 3 (quoting Professor Jeffrey G. Miller).
11. Id. For further discussion of the role of right-wing philanthropy in the evolu-
tion of American law and culture, see JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, No
MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SO-
CIAL AGENDA (1996); J. William Futrell, Closing Statement, Now on Endangered List:
Environmental Law Itself, 19 ENVTL. FORUM 1, 64 (2002); Karen Paget, Lessons of
Right-Wing Philanthropy, 9 AM. PROSPECT 40 (1998), available at http://www.pros
pect.org/printIV9/40/paget-k.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2003); SALLY COVINGTON,
NAT'L COMM. FOR RESPONSIVE PHILANTHROPY, MOVING A PUBLIC POLICY AGENDA: THE
STRATEGIC PHILANTHROPY OF CONSERVATIVE FOUNDATIONS (1998); PEOPLE FOR THE
AMERICAN WAY, BUYING A MOVEMENT: RIGHT-WING FOUNDATIONS AND AMERICAN
POLITICS (1996), available at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/dfiles/file-33.pdf; LEON
HOWELL, UNITED CHURCH BOARD FOR HOMELAND MINISTRIES FUNDING THE WAR OF
IDEAS (1995); LEON HOWELL, ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANG-
ING THE PUBLIC INTEREST FOR PRIVATE GAIN (1993), available at http://www.alliance
forjustice.org/images/collection-images/Justiceforsale.pdf.
2003]
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II. What is Postmodern Federalism?
The Constitution that I interpret is not living, but dead .... 12
-Antonin Scalia
HENRY
Crazy am I? We'll see whether I'm crazy all right ... I am going
to turn that ray on that body and endow it with life.
WALDMAN
And you really believe that you can bring life to the dead?
HENRY
That body is not dead. It has never lived. I created it. I made it
with my own hands from the bodies I took from graves, from the
gallows-anywhere.
HENRY
Look-it's moving. It's alive. It's alive. It's moving. It's alive!
MORITZ
Henry, in the name of God.
HENRY
In the name of God? Now I know what it feels like to be God!13
If these quotes from Justice Scalia's speech and the script of
the 1931 film, Frankenstein, suggest by ironic juxtaposition that
the Rehnquist Court is engaging in something remotely compara-
ble to Dr. Frankenstein's reanimation of a monster from pieces of
the dead, the suggestion is obviously unfair, unfounded and
grossly hyperbolic. Yet I believe that one lesson of the Franken-
stein tale-that arrogant pride can unleash monsters that escape
the control of their makers-is worth remembering as the Rehn-
quist Court continues to propel us in new directions.
Let us begin by demystifying the word "federalism." Federal-
ism, itself, simply refers to any system of power-sharing in which
authority is distributed between what is typically a larger political
unit, such as the United States, and what are typically smaller
political subdivisions, such as the states, which are a part of, but
12. Justice Antonin Scalia, Remarks at Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
Conference, A Call for Reckoning: Religion and the Death Penalty (Jan. 25, 2001),
available at http://pewforum.org/deathpenalty/resources/transcript3.php (last visited
Dec. 11, 2003).
13. FRANKENSTEIN (Universal Studios 1931).
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at least partially independent from, the larger body.14 The Euro-
pean Union and its constituent nations are an example of federal-
ism, as were the Articles of Confederation that the Constitution
supplanted.
Federalism, in other words, is a structural notion that has no
meaning independent of its particularizing details. Under any
given system of federalism, the larger political body can have a
great deal more power than its political subunits, as is the case in
some European nations, or the subunits can wield comparatively
more power than the larger political unit, as was the case under
the Confederate Constitution during the American Civil War. In
normal usage, then, the term "federalism" is agnostic as to how
power is distributed. "Federalists" of the founding generation fa-
vored a strong national government in relation to the states,'15
while the modern Federalist Society appears to favor the dimin-
ishment of national power vis-A-vis the states.
So a word of caution for anyone tempted to use the words "fed-
eralist" or "federalism" to represent any one set of specific ideas or
one side of a partisan debate: over time the term "federalism" has
been used to cover so many contradictory constitutional positions
that it almost ceases to carry any meaning independent of its de-
tails. We hood our eyes if we sign on with a particular brand
name of federalism, because the selective presentation of informa-
tion inherent in any theoretical or ideological system is less com-
plete than the information available generally. 16
American federalism jurisprudence is thought to consist of
three overlapping strands of doctrine. The first strand involves
14. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "federalism" as meaning "the rela-
tionship and distribution of power between the national and regional governments
within our federal system of government." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 627 (7th ed.
1999). Professor Edward Rubin defines federalism to mean "a principle of political
organization in which a single polity, or nation, has both a central government and
separate, geographically defined governments that are subordinate to the central gov-
ernment in certain matters but independent of it in others." Edward L. Rubin, The
Supreme Court's Federalism: Real or Imagined? Puppy Federalism and the Blessings
of America, 574 ANNALS OF THE AM. AcAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 37, 38 (2001).
15. The Supremacy Clause, in effect, codifies the federalists' victory: "This Consti-
tution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof;
and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, in the Authority of the United States,
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
16. My understanding of "federalism" here includes separation of powers issues.
So I'd like to include within the scope of our analysis the deliberate trisection of power
evident in the constitutional plan in the form of separate Articles on the Legislative
(I), Executive (II), and Judicial (III) Branches.
20031
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congressional authority to enact national legislation. The consti-
tutional provisions primarily at issue are the Commerce Clause
17
and section five of the Fourteenth Amendment,' 8 though curtail-
ment of other congressional powers, including the spending
power, is also evident in the lower federal courts.
Between April 12, 1937, when the Court abandoned an overly
restrictive understanding of the commerce power, 19 and April 25,
1995, the day before United States v. Lopez 20 was decided, the
Court did not invalidate a single federal law on the ground that it
was beyond the reach of the Commerce Clause. Litigants are now
relying on Lopez and its progeny to challenge the constitutionality
of many federal laws, including the Clean Water Act,21 the Safe
Drinking Water Act, 22 and the Endangered Species Act, 23 though
their ultimate success in this enterprise appears increasingly
doubtful. 24
Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
power "to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this
[amendment]." 25 In 1997, the Court surprised many observers by
17. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl. 3.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
19. The switch came in National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Two weeks earlier, the Court had rejected the idea that the
due process clause barred governments from regulating working conditions such as
minimum wages and maximum hours. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
20. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j-26 (2000).
23. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). If the latest decisions of the federal courts' are
any guide, these broad-scale attacks on environmental protections are meeting with
heavy skepticism.
24. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that the Safe Drinking Water Act does not exceed the scope of the Commerce
Clause in light of evidence that a number of utilities sell drinking water across state
lines); Treacy v. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding a particular
wetland fell under the jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act because water flowed inter-
mittently from the wetland, through a manmade ditch that crossed under an inter-
state highway, and into traditional navigable waters); GDF Realty Invs. v. Norton,
326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding the Endangered Species Act, even as applied to
species found only within one state, is valid under the Commerce Clause because the
harming of endangered species in the aggregate has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Early in the amendment's history, the Supreme
Court ruled that that section does not give Congress the authority to regulate private
action. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). This was one of the reasons why
the civil rights laws of the 1960s were enacted under the commerce power, rather
than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Civil Rights Cases fell into disfavor among the
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol21/iss1/5
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adding, as an additional test for the validity of congressional ac-
tion under section five, the requirement that "[tihere must be a
congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to the end."
26
The second strand of federalism doctrine arises under the
Tenth Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple."27 For most of the twentieth century, the Tenth Amendment
was thought not, by its own power, to place restrictions on con-
gressional authority. As the Court explained in 1941:
The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its
adoption to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the re-
lationship between the national and state governments as it had
been established by the Constitution before the amendment or
that its purpose was other than to allay fears that the new na-
tional government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise fully their re-
served powers.
From the beginning and for many years the amendment
has been construed as not depriving the national government of
authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted
power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permit-
ted end. Whatever doubts may have arisen of the soundness of
that conclusion, they have been put at rest by the decisions
under the Sherman Act and the National Labor Relations
Act .... 28
After his appointment to the Supreme Court in 1971, Justice
Rehnquist made the revival of the Tenth Amendment a high prior-
ity. Within five years he had assembled a temporary five-justice
majority that struck down a federal law on Tenth Amendment
justices for most of the twentieth century, and the validity of the Civil Rights Cases
was criticized in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966). The Rehnquist majority,
however, often cites the Civil Rights Cases as a source of good law and binding prece-
dent. See, e.g., City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997) ("Remedial legislation
under § 5 'should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth]
Amendment was intended to provide against.'" (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. at 13)).
26. City of Borne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
28. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (citations omitted).
20031
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grounds in National League of Cities v. Usery.29 This decision was
itself overturned nine years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Authority, when Justice Blackmun abandoned as
unworkable the legal test created in National League of Cities.30
Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Rehnquist temporarily removed the
mask of judicial objectivity to make a political observation: "[Na-
tional League of Cities recognized a basic] principle that will, I am
confident, in time again command the support of a majority of this
Court."31 Rehnquist was right as the Court once again made an
about-face in 1992, when it ruled in New York v. United States32
that the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Nuclear Waste Pol-
icy Act violated the Tenth Amendment. The Court later extended
this holding to strike down parts of the Brady Handgun law. 33
Though some say the third strand of the federalism doctrine,
state sovereignty, is linked to the Eleventh Amendment, it is in
fact a freestanding constitutional doctrine. Its advocates say state
sovereignty is both implicitly recognized in that amendment, and
it emanates from tacit, unstated, beliefs of the Framers about the
proper relationship between states and the national union at the
time the Constitution was written, debated, and ratified in 1787
and 1788. Although state sovereignty cases have been a part of
the national scene since well before the 1990s, 34 the theory came
into its own with the Court's 1996 decision in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida,35 which held that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity under its Commerce Clause authority.
Since Seminole Tribe, the Court has accepted and decided a series
of state sovereignty cases that further expand the doctrine. 36
29. 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (5-4 decision) (first decision since the 1930s to strike down
an act of Congress on federalism grounds, overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183
(1968)).
30. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (5-4
decision).
31. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (5-4 decision).
33. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
34. E.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890); Louisiana ex rel. v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711 (1882).
35. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (5-4 decision) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,
491 U.S. 1 (1989) (5-4 decision)).
36. These decisions include three announced simultaneously in 1999: Fla. Pre-
paid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (5-4
decision) (striking down portions of the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy
Clarification Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
527 U.S. 666 (1999) (5-4 decision) (holding Trademark Remedy Clarification Act did
not validly abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
[Vol. 21
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So what then is "postmodern" federalism? I use the term in
reference to the specific changes in constitutional law over the
past decade that makes our present time, depending on the expert
you ask, either a new constitutional moment, a period of rapid sys-
temic change, a time of instability among the ordering paradigms
of constitutional thought, or something else momentous and
important.
Of course, the term "postmodern" implies knowledge of the
"modern." Stated simply, "modern" federalism is the narrative I
learned in law school when I took Constitutional Law in the mid-
1980s. My old constitutional law textbook represents it well.3 7
According to this account, those on the side of increased national
power won every battle, including ratification of the Constitution
itself, the Civil War and the constitutional amendments that fol-
lowed it, the New Deal and rise of the modern state, and the de-
segregation struggles. Indeed, modern twentieth century America
seemed shaped more by what unified us as a nation than by what
separated us as citizens of different states.
According to Brest and Levinson, the story of modern federal-
ism's triumph could be summed up in a chapter entitled "The De-
cline of Judicial Intervention and the Current Doctrine of
Federalism. '38 The story is a version of the "switch in time that
saved nine" narrative. Before 1937 those who believed in unregu-
(1999) (5-4 decision) (holding state immunity from private suit in their own courts
beyond congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation). After the 1999 tril-
ogy, the Court issued several more decisions applying state sovereignty principles.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (5-4 decision) (holding Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act does not contain a clear statement of congressional
intent to abrogate state immunity from suit); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Gar-
rett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding state sovereign immunity bars suits in federal court
seeking money damages for state's violation of Americans with Disabilities Act); Fed.
Mar. Comm'n. v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002) (holding sovereign im-
munity extends to administrative adjudications).
The most recent in this line of cases, Nevada Dep't of Human Resources v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721 (2003), upheld the right of employees to recover money damages under
the Family and Medical Leave Act, though it did so in a manner that left the reason-
ing of its earlier decisions intact. In fact, the result of Hibbs centered on application
of the court-created test for gender discrimination rather than any deference to con-
gressional action.
37. State sovereignty, back in the days of modern federalism, seemed like a dis-
carded costume worn by history's losers to cover up slavery, Jim Crow, and even, to
the bitter end, school desegregation. See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON,
PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1983).
38. Id. at 287.
11
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lated commerce and labor-either because regulation was an un-
acceptable extension of congressional power or because it intruded
into an inviolable zone of freedom over one's economic affairs to
the extent that even commonly accepted labor reforms, including
the prohibition against child labor, were blocked as unconstitu-
tional-had managed to slow the inexorable forces of modernity
fueled by the Depression and the nation's other domestic and in-
ternational predicaments.
Then everything changed in 1937. The Lochner v. New
York 39 Justices were deposed once and for all within a span of
about two weeks in the spring of that year, when the Court de-
cided to abandon both its substantive due process 40 and commerce
clause4 ' lines of decisions and forever, we then believed, alter the
course of constitutional history. In my old casebook there's a sub-
part called the "residue of state sovereignty."42 Arguments about
the reach of the federal commerce power seemed so well settled as
to be virtually taken for granted.
Modern federalism, then, was a time when most forms of con-
gressional action, including the enactment of environmental laws,
sailed through the courts under presumptions of legislative ra-
tionality that the postmodern Court seems to be abandoning.
Even the Chevron doctrine tilted in this direction, as it seemed to
discourage courts from second-guessing agency action in the ab-
sence of clear statutory directives to the contrary.4 3
"Post-modern federalism," in contrast, means the doctrine as
it currently stands after more than a decade of activist reforma-
tion. It can be represented by the current edition of my old Consti-
tutional Law casebook, 44 which replaces phrases like "the residue
of state sovereignty" with ones like "The Rehnquist Court: Finding
Affirmative Limits." I also use the term "postmodern" because the
methodology used by the Court's conservative members is dis-
tinctly postmodern in its skepticism about our ability to decipher
the meaning of language; its willingness to borrow across disci-
plines and realms of experience; its self-absorption; and its will-
39. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
40. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
41. See Nat'l Labor Rel. Bd. v. Jones, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
42. BREST & LEVINSON, supra note 37, at 336.
43. Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
44. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES
AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 2000).
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ingness to covet ideals and principles at high levels of abstraction
while ignoring particularized facts.
45
Specifically, I think one can identify postmodern federalism
by a series of presumptions and logical maneuvers, six in all, that
give away its presence in what might otherwise seem like a nor-
mal court opinion.
III. Six Signs of Postmodern Federalism
Here are six hallmark presumptions and beliefs we can call
the "signs" of postmodern federalism. These signs lay mostly in
the background but contribute mightily to the outcome of Su-
preme Court decisions:
1. Agencies of state and federal governments, if not the U.S.
Congress itself, are generally overreaching in their regu-
lation of business.
2. The Supreme Court, and by extension the lower federal
courts, can and should use the full extent of their power to
curb the excesses of the democratic branches of govern-
ment and the bureaucracies they create.
3. Words and phrases in the Constitution and its amend-
ments are linguistically different but a priori equivalent
at all other meaningful levels and can therefore be
stripped of their historical and cultural context and deci-
phered by textual analysis alone.
4. The truth or falsity of an assertion of fact, including dis-
puted historical fact, can be resolved by citation to legal
authority, thus abandoning the need to recognize the dis-
tinction between fact and law that is central to Anglo-
American jurisprudence.
5. Constitutional holdings need not confront their real-world
consequences.
6. Pragmatic, fact-based reasoning from evidence can be
ignored.
Much has been said and written about signs one, two, and
three, so I'd like to spend our time on the others. The object of
analysis will be the Supreme Court's decision in Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority (FMC),46 and
more specifically the opinions of Justices Thomas (writing for a 5-
45. For an introduction to postmodernism, see STEVEN CONNOR, POSTMODERN
CULTURE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORIES OF THE CONTEMPORARY (1989).
46. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
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4 majority) and Justice Breyer (writing for himself and three col-
leagues in dissent). At first glance, FMC would seem to have little
bearing on environmental protection. The case arose after the
South Carolina Ports Authority denied a berth to a gambling ves-
sel, relying on state policy, an action the ship owner challenged
under the adjudicative proceedings used by the Federal Maritime
Commission to resolve disputes within its jurisdiction.
But adjudications before administrative law judges too closely
resembled real trials to survive the Court's new chastity-based for-
mulation of state sovereign immunity. Under this formulation,
the states entered the Union with their sovereign immunity "in-
tact." If being sued in court were enough to threaten the maiden-
hood of state immunity, the same would be true of being dragged
before a federal agency in a quasi-trial. I suppose it would still
feel the same to the entity (the state itself) whose dignity hangs in
the balance.
Sign 4
First, let's inspect the FMC majority opinion for evidence sign
four, a belief that the "truth or falsity of an assertion of fact, in-
cluding disputed historical fact, can be resolved by citation to legal
authority." Part II of the opinion, a four-paragraph passage
describing the law of state sovereign immunity, contains numer-
ous assertions of historical fact over which historians disagree,
but which are presented as settled facts. Authority for these as-
sertions does not lie in Constitution's text 47 or in the historical
record, as the Court openly acknowledges. 48 Rather, it lies in the
historical dicta and speculation of Alden v. Maine combined with a
pinch of the now-standard quotation from Alexander Hamilton, in
which he muses about sovereign immunity as something within
"the general sense and the general practice of mankind."49
In effect, the FMC majority treats the realm of disputed his-
torical fact as if it could be forever resolved and cemented into
place by a five to four vote of the Supreme Court. As they have in
many of their sovereign immunity decisions, the five Justices who
47. "[Tlhis Court has repeatedly held that the sovereign immunity enjoyed by the
States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment." Id. at 754.
48. The search for the Constitution's original understanding yields "a relatively
barren historical record .... In truth, the relevant history does not provide direct
guidance for our inquiry." Id. at 755.
49. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 248 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ray P. Fairchild ed., 2d
ed. 1981).
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comprised the majority in FMC revert to a magical world in which
open, perhaps unanswerable, questions of history can be an-
swered by judicial decree. The result is a self-perpetuating cycle
of judicial holdings and dicta that needs only cite itself to support
its own suppositions.
Signs 5 and 6
Let's next look for evidence of signs five and six, the idea that
constitutional rulings need not confront their real-world conse-
quences, and the corollary conclusion that pragmatic arguments
based on evidence have little place in constitutional analysis.
Before doing so, though, I'd like to tell the stories of four real peo-
ple whose lives were affected by the FMC ruling.
Paul Jayko.50 When residents of Merion, Ohio, learned that
graduates of River Valley High School were suffering from leuke-
mia and other cancers in unusually high numbers, they called
Paul Jayko, a site coordinator with the Ohio Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection in Bowling Green. It turned out that the
school had been built on the site of a World War II military depot
where radioactive materials and toxic wastes still lay buried.
Then-governor Voinovich directed Jayko and other environmental
and health officials to "leave no stone underturned" in investigat-
ing the cancer cluster. As site coordinator for the Merion site,
Jayko was in charge of all aspects of the investigation. But when
he began to uncover evidence that suggested a possible linkage
between the cancers and exposure to toxic materials at the site,
Jayko found his superiors were more concerned about keeping a
lid on the information than responding to the threat. Jayko wrote
internal memos critical of the Department's efforts and his superi-
ors quickly concluded that he was not a "team player." When he
continued to insist on a thorough investigation, his responsibility
over the site investigation was sharply curtailed.
In the summer of 1997, Jayko was suspended without pay for
ten days for allegedly seeking reimbursement for the beer he or-
dered with his dinner at Pizza Hut with his boss and colleagues on
the investigation team. A federal administrative law judge later
found this allegation to be unfounded, and the suspension moti-
50. See Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1155
(S.D. Ohio 2000) (the state settled the case while Jayko's appeal was pending before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit); Jill Riepenhoff, EPA Whistle-Blower
Gets Job Back, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 2001, at Al.
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vated by a desire to punish Jayko because of his role in the inves-
tigation. That conclusion was of no comfort on the morning after
the suspension, when Jayko found his wife in tears with the news-
paper opened to a headline "EPA Investigator Accused of Boozing
on the Job."
Omar Shafey. 51 To combat a Mediterranean fruit fly infesta-
tion in east central Florida, state agriculture officials sprayed
fields with a mixture of corn syrup and malathion, an insecticide.
More than two hundred people in the spray area were sickened. A
four-year-old asthma patient was hospitalized for two days. A
lawn service worker broke out in blisters where malathion-coated
grass clippings stuck to his neck, arms, and legs. A woman suf-
fered two weeks of vomiting, diarrhea, and respiratory problems
after washing the malathion/corn syrup mixture off her car.
Dr. Omar Shafey, a nationally recognized epidemiologist with
the state Department of Health, conducted a study of the health
effects of the spraying program, concluding that there were "docu-
mented adverse health effects attributable" to the spraying and
that the state should consider safer alternatives than aerial spray-
ing. Although Shafey's findings were ultimately corroborated by
the federal Centers for Disease Control, his superiors demanded
that he tone down the report. He refused. When the final report
was released, after editing by the health department officials, it
recommended only more study and concluded that Shafey's find-
ings "do not allow an association" between the spraying program
and the reported illnesses. The Health Department then com-
menced a painstaking review of Shafey's personnel records. This
internal investigation, which took a month to complete, found that
he had overstated his expense reports by $12.50. Shafey was fired
for this alleged fraud, escorted from his office by an armed Talla-
hassee police officer.
Beverly Migliore.52 Beverly Migliore's rise within the Rhode
Island Department of Environmental Management was rapid and
impressive. She was hired as an intern with the air program in
1986. By 1992 she was in charge of overseeing the hazardous
waste activities of 5,000 Rhode Island companies. Her reputation
as a tough law enforcer helped propel her career, but it became a
liability after a pro-business governor, Lincoln Almond, was
51. Florida v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (N.D. Fla. 2001).
52. Rhode Island v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.R.I. 2000).
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elected to office in 1994. The Department's newly appointed direc-
tor announced a new enforcement policy that would emphasize in-
formal discussions and voluntary actions over citations and
enforcement actions. In 1996, the Department was reorganized
and Migliore was transferred to a new position. She now reported
to someone who had no experience in hazardous waste matters.
In fiscal year 1993, when Migliore ran the state's Resource,
Conservation, and Recovery Act's enforcement office, the Depart-
ment handed out 211 citations for noncompliance. In fiscal year
1998, by contrast, twenty-nine citations were issued. Migliore
complained about the drop-off in enforcement. She was trans-
ferred to a small, windowless office and given the job of briefing
state Economic Development Commissioners every two weeks, a
job that consumed a few hours a week at most. "They basically
want me to do nothing. I'm a non-person here," Migliore told a
reporter in 1999. "I feel terrible. I've lost my career. It was some-
thing I loved to do. ... I worked my way up and I was very happy
representing the state and planned to keep doing it until I
retired."
Anne Rapkin.53 Anne Rapkin was promoted to chief counsel
of the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
(DEP) in 1992, four years after joining the agency. Rapkin, a
graduate of the University of Chicago's prestigious law school, had
turned down lucrative offers in the private sector because she was
committed to serving the public. The election of 1994, however,
brought into office a new governor, John Rowland. Like Rhode
Island governor Almond, Rowland promised to bring a business-
friendly attitude to environmental enforcement. To carry out this
new policy, the governor appointed Sidney J. Holbrook as commis-
sioner of the DEP. Immediately upon his appointment, Holbrook
demoted Rapkin from head of the agency's legal department to
staff attorney. She regained this position only after threatening
legal action. When Holbrook became Governor Rowland's co-chief
of staff, his replacement, Arthur Roque, reorganized the Depart-
ment to take supervision of the agency's attorneys away from
Rapkin. This decision was reversed a month later after Rapkin
again threatened legal action.
In January 1998, Rapkin complied with a Freedom of Infor-
mation request by releasing documents to the Hartford Courant
53. Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Operational Safety & Health Admin., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 285 (D. Conn. 2001).
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that indicated Holbrook and an aide had given the Bridgeport Hy-
draulic Co. access to internal environmental information.
Bridgeport Hydraulic's chief executive was the chief of Governor
Rowland's transition team. That August, Roque was quoted in a
local newspaper as saying, "Anne has a tendency to characterize
things in a way that mask the truth." Rapkin was yanked off a
case after providing a legal opinion on a controversial garbage
loading station, and her responsibilities at the agency were gradu-
ally stripped away. She remained at the agency. "I love what I do
... and I'll be damned if I was going to let those people chase me
out of the agency," she said. On January 5, 2001 commissioner
Roque fired Rapkin for the release of internal documents and pub-
lic criticism of the agency.
Under the environmental whistleblower provisions of federal
law, all four individuals were protected from exactly the sort of
retaliation they suffered for standing up to their superiors. 54 In
enacting these whistleblower measures, Congress understood that
employees of state environmental agencies were and would con-
tinue to face stiff pressure from the states' economic and political
establishment. Without legal protection, they would imperil their
careers and families if they attempted to resist these pressures.
Since the enactment of the whistleblower provisions, scores of
state workers have prevailed in administrative actions, gaining
job reinstatement and damages when faced with job retaliation for
voicing unpopular or controversial views within or outside of the
agency.
Each person whose case is described in this article sought pro-
tection under the whistleblower laws. The two whose cases were
decided by federal administrative law judges initially obtained the
relief they sought. Beverly Migliore was awarded over $800,000
in damages, while Paul Jayko received a more modest recovery.
Ten years ago these awards would have easily withstood judicial
review. But the views of the judiciary have changed radically over
the past decade.
54. Congress enacted seven environmental whistleblower protection bills between
1972 and 1980. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i) (2000); Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9610 (2000); Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000); Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1367 (2000).
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Now the "sovereign dignity" of the states trumps the rights of
individuals who have been wronged by state action. In other
words, the states may not suffer the indignity of being made to
answer for their actions before federal courts and administrative
hearings. These precedents bind the lower federal courts. In each
of the four environmental whistleblower cases, district judges ei-
ther overturned the administrative remedies awarded by the De-
partment of Labor or blocked ongoing investigations before
decision. 55
On August 30, 2002, the First Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the Migliore case on sovereign immunity
grounds, becoming the first federal appellate court to rule on the
issue.56 The fates of all four whistleblowers were sealed by the
FMC decision. Each of them, using a long-established set of fed-
eral whistleblower laws, filed administrative complaints to re-
cover money damages for the illegal retaliation they suffered. But
now, in light of FMC, we know that even administrative hearings
brought by state environmental protection workers against their
own agencies so affront the dignity of the states qua states as to be
barred by sovereign immunity.
Writing in dissent, Justice Breyer challenges the majority to
justify the FMC decision "in terms of its practical consequences." 57
Justice Breyer cited environmental laws and called the majority's
attention to their whistleblower provisions, suggesting those pro-
visions might be threatened as a practical consequence. 58 In fact,
they were, but the majority had nothing to say about these or
other consequences of its ruling. Indeed, the consequences of the
decision seemed barely to enter the majority's thinking at all.
IV. Conclusion: Toward a New Consequentialism
A long-range strategy for minimizing the adverse environ-
mental impacts of the Court's post-modern federalism jurispru-
dence might lie in continuing to emphasize, as Justice Breyer does
in his FMC dissent, the practical, real-world consequences of this
55. See Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1155
(S.D. Ohio 2000) (the state settled the case while Jayko's appeal was pending before
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit); Florida v. United States, 133 F. Supp.
2d 1280 (N.D. Fla. 2001); Rhode Island v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 2d 269 (D.R.I.
2000); Conn. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. v. Operational Safety & Health Admin., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 285 (D. Conn. 2001).
56. R.I. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2002).
57. 535 U.S. 743, 785 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 786 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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body of constitutional doctrine. This paper shows how decisions
such as FMC, which on their face seem to have little bearing on
environmental protection, can in fact profoundly affect the integ-
rity and stability of our environmental protection laws.
For Paul Jayko, Omar Shafey, Beverly Migliore, and Anne
Rapkin, FMC effectively rescinded the legal protections each of
them needed to bring charges of governmental malfeasance into
the judicial and public arenas where the drafters of our federal
environmental statutes expected such charges to be aired, con-
fronted, and resolved. This harms not only the individual
whistleblowers, robbing them of their ability to seek redress for
retaliatory action, but also undermines the purpose of the
whistleblower provisions themselves and sends a clear signal to
all potential whistleblowers that the laws written to protect their
right to speak out cannot actually be relied on in practice.
Renewed attention to facts and consequences-a new "conse-
quentialism"-is nothing new in American law. Amicus briefs,
whether submitted to the Supreme Court or lower federal courts,
are intended, among other things, to inform the judiciary about
the real-world effects their decisions will produce. Indeed, Justice
Breyer and other justices and judges rely on amicus briefs for this
very purpose.
Evaluating abstract legal holdings and theories in light of
their empirical effects is also well within the mainstream of Amer-
ican philosophical and jurisprudential thought. America pragma-
tism, from William James and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to
Richard Rorty, is a uniquely American contribution to world phi-
losophy, and pragmatism in a more general sense is deeply em-
bedded in American thought and law. If post-modern federalism
claims a theoretical hold on current notions of constitutional law,
its proponents bear the burden of showing how their theories and
dogma will operate in the living world. It is a burden they have
thus far failed to meet.
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